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STATUTORY CRIMINAL LAW: THE NEGLECTED PART
SANFORD J. FOX*
The author is an Assistant Professor of Law in Boston College. A member of the New York and District of Columbia bars, he previously served as a Teaching Fellow in the Harvard Law School.
In an age when commercial conduct has been the subject of widespread regulation, a great many
criminal statutes have been enacted pertaining to commerce, agriculture, public health and welfare,
and other matters. These statutes are not often found in the criminal codes of the states, but usually
are scattered throughout the statute books. How numerous are these -'non-code" criminal statutes?
What areas oi conduct do they control? Have they altered the basic concepts of criminology? Should
they be codified, or should they receive uniform treatment by the states? Exploring these questions,
and raising others, Professor Fox calls the bar's attention to some significant implications of the "noncode" criminal law.-EDITOR.
It is a well recognized fact that legislative
manipulation of substantive criminal law has been
scandalously neglected by the critical skills and
judgments that lawyers have applied toward
rational development of other fields of law. The
drafting of a Model Penal Code provides the
potential for reversing this indifference, but much
remains to be accomplished. This paper sets forth
some criminal legislation problems that presently

appear destined to survive the awakening of the
legal profession to its responsibility for the state of
penal law.
Statutory criminal law may be marshalled into
two groups: The first is the relatively homogeneous
triparte collection made in the criminal code'
wherein may be found the restatement of the

common law of crimes, common law as reshaped in
the legislative process,2 and increments to the
substantive criminal law that have

no direct

common law antecedents.3
The second category of penal law is outstanding
* Helpful criticisms of Gerald Abraham, Assistant
Professor, Duquesne Law School, are gratefully
acknowledged. Much of the research could not have
been completed without the competent efforts of

Elizabeth Porada, Research Librarian, Boston College
Law School, 1959-60.
The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the
writer.
I The collection may be called the Criminal Code
(Wisconsin) or the Penal Law (New York) or the
Penal Code (California). It may not have a special
name, as in Massachusetts where the crimes described
in the following paragraph of the text are located in
successive chapters of the laws. See MAss. AN. LAWS

chs. 263-274 (1952).
2 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§402-405, defining . veral
property offenses all closely related to common law
burglary.
3 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 264, §19 (1952), pro-

scribing membership in a subversive organization.

for its lack of homogeneity, except perhaps in that
there is generally little common law history
preceding enactment. It is made up of all the
criminal offenses found outside the criminal code,
that is, in the rest of the statute books.4 In this
category are provisions which authorize six months
incarceration and a S500 fine for employing certain
people during labor difficulties, 5 and for injuring
trees on a state highway; 6 five years imprisonment
and a $5000 fine for using without proper authority
certain licenses issued by the Director of Agriculture;7 six months and S250 for certain improper
practices by a dentistY The variety precludes an
adequate description.
These statutes are incredibly dispersed in the
statute volumes. For example, in the 1959 edition
of the Massachusetts General Laws Annotated,
brought out by a leading publisher, there are
forty-eight volumes: one is devoted to the constitution, three to a general index, and one to crimes and
offenses. In the remaining forty-three volumes
there are no less than eleven hundred criminal
offenses.9 Only seven of these forty-three volumes
lack any criminal provisions. And, needless to say,
4 It is impossible to draw a firm line between "noncode" offenses generally and "code" offenses similarly
lacking common law antecedents. The distinction then
relates to location in the statutory organization.
149, §23A (1952).
6 Id., ch. 87, §10.
CAL. AGRI. CODE §1258.
8 N.Y. EDUc. LAW §6612(4).
6MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.

9 The distribution is as follows: (volume number:
number of offenses) 2:8. 3:8, 4:13, 5:23, 6:78, 7:10,
8:21, 9:11, 10:14, 11:24, 12:191, 13:10, 16:22, 17:74,
18:24, 19:135, 20:98, 21:53. 22:82, 23:4, 25:15,
26:50, 27:25, 28:39, 29:14. 30:2, 31:2, 33:15, 35:3,
36:9, 37:3, 40:5, 41:2, 42:4. 43:2, 45:7.
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the index is a wholly unreliable guide to the presence or content of these criminal penalties.
This startling state of affairs is not merely
indigenous to Massachusetts. In Wisconsin the
non-code crimes have been described as "scattered
0
through the remainder of the statutes."' Almost
twenty-five years ago it was reported that in
California "thirty-eight pages of Cal. Pen. Code
(Hellyer, 1935) are taken up with an index to penal
statutes ndt in the Penal Code...."I'
How many of these offenses exist and what kinds
of conduct they seek to suppress is not precisely
known, since it appears no one has attempted to
examine the statutes of the several states or even
to deal comprehensively with the statutes of any
one state.'2 This discussion is concerned with
problems raised by a preliminary and elementary
examination of the "forgotten" laws.
The absence from the literature of any comprehensive analysis of non-code criminal law
indicates that these statutes have been deemed
unworthy of scholarly attention." One does find a
note of concern expressed, however, by those who
have perceived the extent of criminal law proliferation.' 4
10Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350,
357.
7
1tL. Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes-188 -

1936, 50 HARV. L. REv. 616, 622 n.26 (1937).
12There is a brief study of all Wisconsin criminal
statutes by students at the Ufiiversity of Wisconsin
Law School, reported in 1956 Wis. L. REv. 154, 625,
641 and 656. There are also unanalyzed collections of
all the Massachusetts criminal statutes. See BELL,
INXx zo PENALTIES FOR CRIME AND CRIMINAL
EvIDENcE, PLEADING AND PRACTISE (1922); McCARTHY, MASSACHUSETTS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1923).

A general survey of some of the more ludicrous aspects
of "non-code" crime can be found in Baker, Legislative
Crimes, 23 MIN. L. REv. 135 (1939).
1The outstanding exception to this lack of attention is the study of criminal statutes imposing strict
liability, which statutes are found mostly outside of the
code collections. E.g., see Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 32 CotLu-. L. REv. 50 (1932).
Another area of mainly non-code law under study is
"white-collar" crime, defined as "a crime committed
by a person of respectability and high social status in
the course of his occupation."

SUTHERLAND,

WiITE-

2 (1949). For a recent survey of the
status of research into white-collar crime see Newman,
l'ile-Collar Crime, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 735
(1958).
14For example, in 1937 it was stated:
"There is scarcely any trade or profession into which
a man may go today which does not find itself controlled in its peculiar features by legislative mandate.
The common law has never gone far enough inthis
direction; the genesis of such statutory regulation
antedates the period under discussion by centuries.
The major part of the statutes now in effect, however,
have heen enacted within the last fifty years. It is
COLLAR CRIME

The concept of harmless error is well known to
the common law. Such error can appear in not only
the judicial hut also the legislative process, and it
may be urged that the statutes under consideration represent merely an innocuous miscarriage.
There are, however, cogent reasons why the
existence and continued multiplication of these
penal statutes cannot be viewed as inconsequential
and why our ignorance of them ought not persist.
I. THE PROBLEMS

Lack of Any Comprehensive Treatment
Criminal law generally has a stepchild status; 5
the same is true of that part of the penal law found
outside the penal code. In every real sense it is part
and parcel of the penal law of the states. Quantitatively, it may be the bulk of the penal law.16 Its
importance is at least as "cardinal" as the traditional penal law since (1) it protects many of the
same interests of men seeking to live productively
in an ordered society; (2) the "non-code" penal
law provides its protection with the same mechanisms and facilities of prosecution and punishment; and (3) in many instances its impact goes
beyond the scope of the more traditional criminal
law. The supporting evidence can be quickly
sketched.
(1) One of the prime functions of the traditional
criminal la%- is to protect persons from unjustified
risks of death and serious bodily injury. Many of
impossible even to summarize the fields into which
the criminal law has been obtruded; a welter of special
interests, specific abuses, publicized evils, and vague
policies have dictated its direction. Much of this regulation is done by penal statutes not incorporated into the
penal code proper, and is known for the most part only
to the businessmen concerned and to the state departments charged with the duty of enforcement.
Other more general statutes deal with matters such as
false advertising, misuse of trade marks, resale price
agreements, factory acts, sale of convict-made goods,
and weights and measures.
"One result of this has been to make everyone a
criminal. If the fines and short jail terms for which one
was legally liable were actually enforced, few would
have any net income, or leisure out of jail in which to
spend it." L. Hall, op. cit. supra note 11, at 622-23.
15"Deispife its cardinal importance, penal law in the
United States has never had the type of specialized
attention that has nurtured the development of private
law and those aspects of public law that bear directly
on the regulation of important economic interests."
Wechsler, The Challenge of a .f odd Penal Code, 65
HARv. I. REV. 1097, 1098 (1952).
16 It has been said that this is true in Wisconsin.
See Platz, op. cil. supra note 10. The Massachusetts
"non-code" statutes outnumber the statutes in the
Massachusetts "criminal code" by more than three to
one.
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the criminal offenses found outside the criminal
code, at least in Massachusetts, are designed to accomplish precisely the same end-a lessening of
unjustified and preventable personal harm. There
are, for example, the public health criminal
provisions'r and the criminal provisions relating to
use and inspection of dangerous instrumentalities.' s
The threat to the general security of misconduct
under these and similar statutes, it is submitted, is
far more serious than that produced by any single
criminal homicide. In fact, the number of lives
endangered by the spread of a disabling disease or
by boiler and air tank explosions indicates that,
relatively speaking, murder may be a trivial
problem.19
(2) The consequences to the violator of these
and many other "non-code" crimes are exactly the
same as befall the robber, the rapist, and the
burglar. He is deprived of financial resources
20
through a fine, of liberty through incarceration.
He incurs expenses of counsel to defend and guide
him through the technicalities of a criminal trial.
If he incurs a lesser moral condemnation than the
traditional criminal, this is because the moral sense
underlying the condemnation is of a relatively
rigid nature, not because control of disease and
explosions are problems that can be safely or
ethically ignored.
(3) Beyond question the impact of these laws
brings criminality to new areas of activity. Probably the most perceptible expansion of statutory
criminal law has been in the regulation of commercial conduct. It is, as has been pointed out
above, impossible even to summarize this development.28
17E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §5 (1952) (violation of sanitary code punishable by up to one year
imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine).
18E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 146, §33 (1952) (violation of provisions relating to inspection of boilers, air
tanks, etc., punishable by up to six months imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine).
19"Crimes malum in se are such as murder, rape,
arson, treason and robbery. Crimes malum prohibitum
are such as driving on the wrong side of the road, overspeeding, embezzlement, bigamy, health laws, etc. So
far as danger to society is concerned I see no difference
between the two classes of crimes. Murder deprives
society of a member, and the state of a possible defender. But more persons are killed by automobiles than
are murdered each year, and more persons are carried
off by tuberculosis contracted in sweated industries in
violation of labor laws than are killed by automobiles."
Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Men Rea,
17 ILar L. REv. 578, 587 (1923).
20In Massachusetts fully 511 of the 1100 "non-code"

offenses authorize a jail or prison term.
21 See note 14, supra.
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A Changing Concept of Crime
If it is at all important to know what is encompassed by the concept of crime, then the
statutory developments under discussion must
receive consideration. It is often and unequivocally
stated that the essence of crime is the moral defect
of the criminal;r2- yet this assertion is not immutable
dogma, unaffected by years of continuous and farreaching counter-assertions by American legislatures through enactment of "non-code" crimes
largely lacking in moral connotations. The essence
of crime must be adjudged inductively.
But without the basic data concerning this mass
of criminal provisions we cannot deal with the vital
question whether a changing ethical conception is
represented by such factors as the number of
circumstances to which the penalties apply, the
nature of these circumstances, and the magnitude
of the penalties provided. That is, comprehensive
research may show that substantial criminal
penalties are provided for conduct that represents
a deviation from neither traditional nor emergent
standards of morality, but rather from standards
such as those necessary to keep a free enterprise
system functioning smoothly, to make urban living
a physically and aesthetically tolerable existence,
or to minimize the personal dangers inherent in an
impersonal and mechanized society.
Experience may indicate that striving for such
ends as these produces the need for precise and
comprehensive regulation through criminal penalties, but one suspects that even a "knowing" or
"intentional" violation of the regulations would
not, with any significant frequency, produce the
same inference of "evil" character that might be
drawn in regard to the murderer or rapist or
swindler. In this sense it may no longer be "wicked'
to be a criminal, and generalized statements as to
what "crime" and "criminal" means may no
longer be adequate.
Definitely establishing that these terms have
lost much of their moral impact, as on available
evidence appears to be the case, would serve to
focus the efforts of many dealing with the crime
problem, lawyers and non-lawyers alike. Those
committed to the dependence of criminal law on
conventional notions of morality, mostly lawyers,
would deprecate the legislative departures and
seek to preserve the connection between law and
22 E.g., "Crime does and should mean condemnation. . . ." MODEL PENAL CoDE §2.05, comment at
140 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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morality by moving the system of amoral regulation out of the penal law. On the other hand, those
to whom it is regrettable that crime is considered a
moral problem, mostly the criminologists, would
welcome these developments as an indication that
legislatures are now or may soon be ready to accept
more utilitarian views in dealing with traditional
crime and criminals.
Regardless of what the a priori criminological
commitment is, it is obvious that neither group
can progress on this issue with maximum effectiveness without the basic legislative facts on
which to base its case.
Problems of Administration
The third factor prompting concern for these
statutory developments is that the administration
of penal law poses major difficulties, as in the great
degree of choice possessed by prosecutors concerning enforcement of the criminal law.0 There
are special difficulties in regard to offenses outside
the penal code, since so few cases concerning them
reach appellate courts or find their way into
judicial statistics where even a slight amount of
information would be available concerning enforcement policies and practices. The situation is
especially complex, since investigative functions
related to many "non-code" laws are frequently
lodged in an inspecting agency outside the prosecutor's control. Recent times have seen few disclosures of corruption and bribery to equal those
relating to the activities of these inspection and
4
investigative agencies.
But not even a start can be made on understanding and improving the administration of these
"non-code" offenses without knowledge of the
kinds of laws and the policies underlying them with
which the administration is concerned.
The Need for Uniformity
The variations from state to state in the substance of the penal laws have been passed off with
23 "A society that holds, as we do, to belief in law
cannot regard with unconcern the fact that prosecuting
agencies can exercise so large an influence on dispositions that involve the penal sanction, without reference
to any norms but those that they may create for
themselves.... Indeed, one of the major consequences
of the state of penal law today is that administration
has so largely come to dominate the field without effective guidance from the law." Wechsler, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 1102.
24 E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1960, p. 1, col. 8 (city
ed.), indicating a five million dollar fraud in delivery
of fuel oil under protection of personnel of the New
York City Bureau of Weights and Measures.

little concern; it is said that while uniformity is
important in the area of business, it is undesirable
in the area of social ideas.2 As
. to the non-code
penal law, however, uniformity is of great valueand precisely because it pertains so markedly to
business affairs. In Wisconsin. for example, it has
been said that market crimes-"those crimes in
which the criminal's or the victim's activity in
making a living by the sale of goods or services is
directly involved in the criminal conduct"-make
up more than half of all the criminal offenses. As an attempt to regulate commercial conduct
these offenses represent an ad hoc addition to the
commercial code. It would be surprising indeed if
business decisions and policies were formulated
without regard to the demands of the penal law.
In view of this, and of the ever-widening scope of
multistate commercial activity, it seems apparent
that uniformity is highly desirable and should be
sacrificed only upon the appearance of weighty
counter-considerations.
Codification
Closely related to uniformity considerations is
the need for a systematized and comprehensive
collection of statutes.
The ancient doctrine of ignuranta legis iteminern
excusat puts a unique premium on knowledge of
penal law. The consequences to the offending
individual make it imperative that every feasible
step be taken to minimize the possibilities of
ignorance. The sheer quantity of statutory regulation makes it unlikely, however, that the individual
citizen not learned in the law can dissipate his
ignorance even with the aid of well designed
codifications. At this point in legal history the
application of criminal penalties to "ignorant" offenders cannot be equated merely with advice to
learn the law. It amounts most clearly to the suggestion, "See a good lawyer, or else."
But, generally speaking, even the advice of
counsel does not shield from criminality.Y The
25 "Uniformity is not as such a value of importance
in this field, as it is, for example, in the case of the
commercial code. It is to be expected that substantial
differences of social situation or of points of view among
the states should be reflected in substantial variations
in their penal laws." Wechsler, The American Law
Institute: Some Obserrations on its Modl Penal Code
42 A.B.A.J. 321 (1956).
26 Comment, Interestl and Institutions Reflected in
Wisconsin Penal Statutes, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 154, 162.
27 People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 220 Pac.'436
(1923). It has been held, however, that a defense is
established where the defendant was aware that his
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prize goes only to him who is right. In view of this,
it is difficult to justify a scattering of penal statutes
from one end of the statute books to the other. The
professional effort necessary to enable an attorney
to advise safely that contemplated action would
be free from criminality is overwhelming. The
impact of this state of affairs can be fairly estimated by supposing that a tax attorney were
required to search for statutes pertaining to
taxation in every volume of the statutes, relying
upon generally unreliable indices only at the peril
of his client's affairs. It is difficult to conceive of the
tax bar permitting such a situation to persist very
long.
The apparent scope of contemporary statutory
crime makes a lack of codification virtually impossible to justify. If it is true that an attorney cannot
act as a competent business advisor without keeping an eye out for tax consequences, it is becoming
equally true that the other eye must be fixed on the
criminal law.
This need for codification is closely related to
the need for uniformity. To the extent that
variations in underlying social and economic
policies deny achievement of uniformity, the
problems thus created could be significantly
mitigated by a uniform method of codification
designed to point up existing differences. Even a
criminal law loose-leaf service may be a necessary
appendage to codification.
It may be mentioned, too, that establishing a
method of codifying and classifying criminal
statutes in this country so as to avoid inadvertent
violations is of substantial international significance. As it becomes more imperative that Americans engage in overseas investment and business
activity, and there seems little doubt that it is
becoming imperative, the need for knowledge of
foreign law becomes a clear necessity. This need
has already been recognized in the field of taxation.n Criminal law, at least that pertaining to
conduct would be within the area regulated by criminal
statutes and, further, that he acted only upon the
advice of his attorney that the course of action would
fall outside the scope of the statutes. Long v. State, 5
Terry 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
29 "Effective communication has long been recognized
as the key to understanding in the world community.
In the international commerce sector much progress
has been made to bridge the gaps arising from differences in language, as well as differences in icial,
economic, and political structures. Yet even i. this
sector severe barriers to effective communication
remain. Not the least important of these is the lack of
knowledge concerning the tax systems of the world.
Such knowledge as does exist with regard to foreign tax
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economic activity, is of no less importance. As a
matter of fact, few events are as disruptive of
good international relations as finding oneself in a
foreign criminal court foi no known reason or
having one's business affairs suddenly subject to
the intervention of foreign police. Developing an
internationally valid method of collecting, classifying and analyzing relevant criminal statutes may
be a useful step to follow success in ordering the
American laws.
The Size of the Penal Law

There are mushrooming numbers of "noncode" crimes. As has been indicated, these offenses
constitute the bulk of statutory criminal law in
Wisconsin and outnumber the criminal code penal
law in Massachusetts in a ratio of more than three
to one.
Even if all these statutory crimes were based on
the most enlightened general principles of criminal
law, the problem of the size of the criminal law
would remain. Effective enforcement is not
possible without devoting public resources in a
quantity that no society faced with crucial needs
for defense, education, and welfare programs can
afford. An over-sized, albeit rational, penal law
can be only discriminatingly enforced, and this is
an invitation to corruption. In addition, vigorous
enforcement of the penal law regulating commerce
may so deplete the financial resources of commerce
through fines or remove the most skillful from
positions of management through incarceration
that the economic health of society would be
seriously impaired.
It must be faced that this particular problem is
not simply one of separating offenses that involve
risks of serious and unjustified harm from those
that do not. Nor is it one of finding the proper
sphere of operation for the concept of deterrence or
the goal of reformation. The problem of the size of
the penal law presents the question of what is to be
done when there is too much risk of harm for the
criminal law to handle, too much conduct to be
deterred, too many persons manifesting a need for
systems is in large measure a matter of private province.
With few exceptions, the American with interest in a
foreign tax problem does not have readily available
the necessary treatises and other tax materials, m-ich
less some method of providing a reasonable measure
of currency.
"Harvard Law School's Wforld Tax Series is designed
to fulfill the long felt need for basic information in the
tax systems of most of the major nations of the world."
Chommie, Book Review, 13 TAX L. REV. 383 (1958).
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involuntary re-education? In short, what are the
principles of legislation by which some portion
of an otherwise rational penal law is to be assigned
to other methods of control? These questions cannot, of course; receive any satisfactory answer until
the precise magnitude of the problem has been
accurately surveyed.
Strict Liability
The fact that some of the "non-code" offenses
dispense with the common law requirement of
inens rca has produced the only observable concern
for developments in this part of the penal law 9
The judgment has been all but universal that these
offenses should be removed from the criminal law.
The utilitarian argument relies on the "morally
neutral" nature of the conduct violating these
statutes, asserting that,
"In the absence of minimal culpability, the law
has neither a deterrent nor corrective nor an
incapacitative function to perform."30 'Taken at face value, this consideration presses
strongly for a comprehensive re-examination of
this portion of the "non-code" offenses in order to
learn the exact problems the statutes are designed
to deal with as well as the available alternatives.
Conceding that strict criminal liability statutes
present a challenging problem, it is nevertheless the
view of the writer that the nature of this problem
has been misunderstood. Only by oversimplification can, it be maintained that there is no utilitarian
value in strict liability. There can be, and undoubtedly is, a deterrent value to these statutes.
Deterrence means inducement of obedience to
the law by the example of the punishment of
violators. Does the imposition of strict criminal
liability induce others to avoid punishment?
In the strict liability cases neither a defense of
ignorance of the law nor of mistake of fact is
available. As to those unaware of the law, it is
commonly said that punishment of others cannot
9 The only accurate statement that can be made
concerning the relative number of these strict liability
statutes is that there are some of them. In the absence
of knowledge concerning the absolute number of
criminal offenses in the statutes, it could be only conjecture to say there are many or few. Obviously, fifty
such statutes would be many in a total of 150 statutory
offenses and few in total of 1500. Nevertheless, these
offenses have been described both as "a large body of
modern law," Hart, The Aimas of the Criminal Law, 23
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 422 (1958), and as "comparatively small" in number, Mueller, On Contnon
Law Hens Rca, 42 Mixx. I.. REV. 1043, 1103 (1958).
30 Model Penal Code §2.05. comment at 140 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).

influence their behavior. But what may be the
effect of prosecution on lack of knowledge? It may
be that the punished person is a member of a welldefined class, such as one occupationally defined, in
which all members are likely to be apprised, perhaps through a trade journal, of such happenings.
It is highly unlikely that ignorance within that
class would prevail for very long. In this sense,
prosecution may well be an efficient means of legal
education. Of course, the larger the percentage of
strict liability offenses found to relate to business
activity, the more this exception to the inoperativeness of deterrence tends to swallow the rule.
But when attention is turned to those who know
of the law but lack knowledge of the facts producing criminality, the situation is markedly different and the dominant generalization would seem
to be that strict liability can have a definite
deterrent effect. It is clear that we have no
empiric evidence that would supply an authoritative answer either way. But knowledge of
human nature would seem to indicate that, unless
substantial inconvenience or cost is involved, and
perhaps even then, an expanded effort will be made
to find out the facts and, if possible, avoid a similar
fate. It must be kept in mind that we are discussing
situations where emotional overtones, such as those
frequently accompanying violent crime, would
usually be absent or would not interfere significantly with the normal desire to avoid violating
the law.
For example, after Mr. Mixer was convicted for
illegally transporting a substance he did not know
to be liquor,"' it seems likely that both he and his
colleagues did more to learn the nature of the
material entrusted to them than they did before
the conviction. To the extent that this is conduct
designed to lessen the risk of harm, in this case the
transportation of liquor, it is exactly the kind of
behavior one hopes to produce when speaking of
deterrence. The fact that this risk-lessening conduct cannot insure obedience to the law in all cases
is irrelevant to whether strict liability stimulates
people to attempt to obey the law. But this is, of
course, not always true. Purposefully engaging in
risk-lessening conduct may not be a feasible course
of action.n The problem with strict liability is not
31Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E.
249 (1910).
32 In discussing strict liability under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act it has been perceptively
noted that "Such strict liability would seem to have
some value as a preventive, particularly in fostering
greater care by manufacturers in choosing and super-
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that it has no deterrent effect; it is that it does not
always have this effect. The fact that there has
been no study of strict liability statutes with this
distinction kept in mind has helped foster the
widespread misunderstanding and perhaps undue
condemnation of strict liability crime.
II. THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL CODE REVISION ON
NON-CODE OFFENSES

It is important to note the effects of criminal law
revision and reform on the problems outlined
above. The conclusion emerges that the problems remain neglected and unsolved, and this is perhaps
the most serious problem of all. Three projects are
considered-the Louisiana revision of 1942, the
Wisconsin revision of 1955, and the American -Law
Institute's Model Penal Code. These represent the
most recent major attacks on defective statutory
penal law.
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The diversity of these persisting criminal laws is'
reminiscent of the Massachusetts collection:
secreting seamen, 59 violating laws governing leases
of public lands, 0 unlawfully practicing account42
ing,41 occupying a dwelling unfit for habitation,
noncompliance with laws relating to female
employees, 3 violating health rules for cosmetic
therapy, 4 etc.

The code barely recognizes the existence of noncode crime in its section granting discretion to the
district attorney to proceed under the provisions of
the code or under "some other provision of the
Revised Statutes, some special statute, or some
constitutional provision"' 5 when the conduct is
criminal according to more than one statute.
Inasmuch as the centralization and prosecuting
option represent the only legislative46 impact of
the code on "non-code" criminal law, the problems

described in the first part of this paper continue to
be largely unsolved in Louisiana.

The Louisiana Criminal Code of 194213

Prior to enactment of the new code, the basic
criminal law of Louisiana was embodied in the
Crimes Act of 1805. This collection of substantive
offenses had been substantially augmented by
other penal statutes during the near century and a
half of its reign.3 ' The purpose of the 1942 Code
was almost exclusively to bring about consolidation. The coverage of the code's approximately i00
substantive articles permitted repeal of more than
500 separate statutes. 5 Thus, for example, the new
criminal mischief article36 replaced twelve separate
statutes;' the criminal damage to property article
replaced twenty statutesH
The value of such centralization is not to be
depreciated; obscurity engendered by overlapping
and inconsistency should not be part of any penal
law. But the code represents a job only partially
completed. The Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950
contain many penal provisions that antedate the
1942 Code and remain uncollected and unanalyzed.
vising employees or in maintaining satisfactory operating conditions; but it has a questionable effect when
applied to such groups as distributors or manufacturers
operating under high standards who, as a practical
matter, cannot take further precautions." Dev'dopments
in the Law, The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
67 HARv. L. REV. 632, 695 (1954).
3 LA. CRIM.CODE §§1 et seq. (1942).
34There are no common law crimes in Loui-'ana.
See State v. Robinson, 143 La. 543, 78 So. 933 (1 )18).
31LA. AcTs 1942, No. 43, §3.
36LA. CRIM. CODE §59 (1942).
37Ibid. (draftsmen's comment).
38Id., §60 (draftsmen's comment).

Wisconsin Criminal Code of 195547
In Wisconsin, the 1955 Criminal Code affected

the "non-code" crimes in two ways. First, it
shifted the location of criminal, statutes; 244 sections were removed from the criminal code.' 8
Three criminal statutes were moved from one point
outside the code to another point outside the
code. 4 9 And a handful of non-code sections were
transferred into the code, producing a partial
centralization of perjury and false swearing of31 LA. REV. STAT.
40 Id., 41:1221.
41 Id., 37:91.
42 Id.,
43 Id.,

34:874 (1950).

40:564(4).
23:362.
4 Id., 37:520.
11LA. CRIM. CODE §4 (1942).
46 The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that
§27 of the code, dealing with attempts, is applicable
to attempts to commit "non-code" crime. State v.
Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604 (1950).
47WIs. STAT. §§939.01 et seq. (1955).
48 The figure 244 represents a count of sections of the
old penal code, WIS. STAT. §§3.40.01 et seq. (1953),
assigned new section numbers outside the new criminal
code by the statute enacting the new code, WIs. L.
ch. 696 (1955). "All such statutes have been renumbered
and transferred, usually without change, into other
parts of the statute book." Platz, op. cit. supra note
10, at 358. The figure 244 does not include sections of
the former code that were repealed.
41 WIs. STAT. §§175.05, 175.10, & 175.12 (1955) -are
now found in a new chapter 134, entitled "Miscellaneous
Trade Regulations," as §§134.35, 134.50, and 134.51.
One of these sections deals with failure of a telegraph
company to endorse the time of receipt on the messages given it for transmissioh, and the other two relate to certain aspects of the poultry business.
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ienses30 No reason appears why the centralization
was only partially accomplished. Immediately
prior to the enactment of the new code it was
reported that in the Wisconsin statutes there were
seventeen separate crimes against government
involving "giving false information (perjury). 51
Only two of these were in the former criminal
code.Y It seems that eleven of the seventeen are
still to be found scattered in the statute books.Y3
It is obvious that the enactment of the new code
has had the most minimal and indiscriminate impact on criminal statutes outside the code. This
has been regretfully acknowledged by the Assistant
Attorney General of Wisconsin."
It remains to note the second effect the new code
has had on the criminal statutes outside the code.
The first chapter of the code, entitled "General
Provisions,"15 applies "to crimes defined in other
chapters of the statutes as well as to those defined
in'the criminal code,"' ' 6 with two exceptions. The
section containing definitions of words and
phrases" and the one dealing with "criminal
intent" ," are to have no operation outside the
criminal code. 5
'0

WIs. STAT. §§85.08(36), 159.14(1), 215.385, 221.20
STAT. §§946.31 &946.32 (1955).

(1953) are now in Wxs.

61Comment, Interests and Institutions Reflected in
Wisconsin Penal Statutes, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 154, 157.
62Wis. STAT. §§346.01, 346.02 (1953).
0 E.g., WIs. STAT. §158.15 (1955) (false oath by a

barber). No attempt has been made to verify whether
the figure eleven is precisely correct. The section
penalizing interference with fire fighting equipment,
id., §213.095(2), (3), has also been moved into the
criminal code as §941.12.
4 "The code,... is by no means all the criminal law
of the state. Many criminal laws-in fact the numerical
majority and the quantitative bulk of them--are to be
found scattered through the remainder of the statutes.
"Roughly, these extra-code laws may be regarded as
'regulatory'--statutes which regulate conduct which is
not always essentially bad, or at least is tolerated under
controlled conditions. Examples are the corrupt practices act, regulating political campaigns; the fish and
ga'me laws; the law of the road; the uniform narcotic
drug act; laws licensing and regulating trades, businesses
and professions, including the liquor traffic; laws
regulating the practices of the market place; the blue
sky law and a host of others.
"It requires no argument to demonstrate that such
laws, however much they may stand in need of revision,
are not, a proper subject for a project like the one here
under consideration. Not only would it require an
unconscionable amount of time; it would require intimate knowledge of the detdils of more fields of human
activity than could be comprehended by any group of
people such as those who devoted so many days to the
development of the code." Platz op. cit. supra note 10.
11Wis. STAT. §939 (1955).
56Id., §939.20.

57Id., §939. 22.
66Id., §939.23.

It seems puzzling why the legislature should
provide that certain words should have certain
meanings within the code, but be indifferent to
whether the same words have the same meaning
outside the code. Why, for example, should "transfer" mean "any transaction involving a change in
possession of any property, or a change of right,
title, or interest to or in any property" 60 for
purposes of the criminal code, but not for other
purposes? Only confusion can result from statutes
using the same words with varying meanings. Of
course, definitions must be constructed to suit the
particular purpose of the statute involved. In view
of the fact that the legislature (and the law
revisers)" did not know how many and what kinds
of criminal statutes the definitions would apply to
outside the criminal code, it may have been the
wisest course to restrict the scope of the definitions
as was done; nevertheless, clarity is hardly
achieved by this restriction.
The exemption of the section dealing with
"criminal intent" from application outside the
code is a more serious shortcoming." This section
enacts a legislative criterion for determining when
a criminal statute imposes strict liability; the
absence of any of certain specific terms (concerning
intent, knowledge, or belief) mentioned in subsection (1) indicates the imposition of strict liability.
Prior to enactment of the code it was stated that
"the dominant characteristic of the criminal statutes of Wisconsin is their ambiguity on the issue
of the requirement of fault."" Although this resolution of the ambiguity appears to produce some
harsh results within the criminal code," our concern is for the crimes outside the code. Here the
59Id., §939.20.

6 Id., §939.22 (40).
61See note 54 supra.
12 This

provides:

"WVhen criminal intent is an element of a crime in the
criminal code, such intent is indicated by the term
'intentionally', the phrase 'with intent to', the phrase

'with intent that', or some form of the verbs 'know' or
'believe'." Wis. STAT. §939.23 (1) (1955).

63Remington, Liability lWitlhout Fault Criminal
Statutes-Their Relation to Hfajor Developments in
Contemporary Economics and Social Policy: The Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis.L. Rav. 625.

64E.g., according to §941.04 there is authorized a
five year term of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for
mooring a navigation craft to a bridge under circumstances endangering human life. None of the words
importing "criminal intent" are mentioned. Were it

not for the legislative policy in §939.23, a court could
require knowledge of the circumstances as an element

of the offense. But the clear implication of §939.23 is
that in the absence of the magic words no "criminal
intent" is required.
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result is that the ambiguity continues as before; it
continues in what appears to be the areas most in
need of clarification. The 1956 study of liability
without fault statutes in Wisconsin indicated that
"key social and economic tension points, such as
transportation, food and dairy, tobacco, employeremployee, insurance, drugs, conservation, liquor,
family, care of minors, vehicles and highways, and
elections are most frequently regulated by such
criminal statutes."6 5 Almost all of these offenses
are found outside the criminal code."
The effects produced by application of the
"General Provisions" (other than the two exempted sections discussed above) to crimes outside
the code can be worked out only by examining-each
of these crimes inthe light of the overriding provisions. Since such an examination was beyond the
scope of the work of the code revisers, it obviously
cannot be undertaken here. There are, however,
some patent problems to be noted.
Section 939.14 of the code provides, "It is no
defense to a prosecution for a crime that the victim
also was guilty of a crime or was contributorily
negligent."
This provision produces curious results when
applied to strict liability offenses where there is
theoretically no moral defect shown. That is, a
crime may be committed by one not "at fault"
against one who was "at fault." This kind of topsyturvy morality enforced on jurors requires some
justification. Justification may be found where
there is a public interest in preventing the forbidden conduct above and beyond the public interest in protecting the victim. Thus the jury may
properly feel that more is involved than the moral
nature of the conduct of the criminal and that of
the victim when the crime is one such as selling
adulterated food. 6 Even though the purchaser may
have been negligent or reckless in making the
purchase (as where he had the opportunity to
recognize the adulterated quality of the food before the sale was made), a jury may deem it sufficiently important to seek to stimulate others to
avoid offering adulterated food for sale, to overlook the misplaced "fault" and impose the penalty.
This justification may be completely lacking,
however, when there is no overriding public inter65 1956 Wis. L. REv. 625, 628.
6 There are also offenses in the

criminal code dealing
with these subjects. Homicides by vehicle, §§940.08,
940.09; abandonment of young child, §940.28; wrongfu! use of vehicles, §§941.01, 941.03, 941.04.
6-WIs. STAT. §§97.25, 97.72(3) (1953).
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est and when the implications of the harm are
significant only to the parties involved. Thus where
the "victim" solicits advice and assistance from the
accused relating to hunting activities, kli.wing or
having good reason to know that the accused is
in no way qualified to render competent advice or
assistance, one might well be sympathetic to the
accused in a prosecution for acting as a guide without a license.6 Why should the law require the
jury to reach its decision without taking into
consideration the "fault" of the person whom the
statute is designed to protect?
One more example will suffice to point out that
the blanket application of the "General Provisions" to offenses outside the criminal code may

not constitute wise legislation. These provisionsinclude such inchoate crimes as conspiracy. 6 It
requires no extensive argument to demonstrate
that the crime of conspiracy is potentially subject
to much abuse and represents the most that society
is, or should be, willing to do in forbidding otherwise harmless conduct in order to frustrate the
future accomplishment of a substantive evil. The
rationale is that the magnitude of the evil justifies
preventative action when the probability of accomplishment attains significant proportions, i.e.,
when there is an igreed commitment to accom-

plishment.
But just as there are gradations in the scope and
degree of the risk of accomplishment along which
the line between criminality and non-criminality
must be drawn, there are also gradations in -the
magnitude of the substantive evil calling for the
drawing of a line. In other words, wise judgment
may dictate that society should bear the risk of
harm represented by certain agreements, for example, one to sell a ticket to a University of Wisconsin football game in violation of the conditions
printed on itYO Perhaps the sale itself ought not
be a substantive crime in the first place. As th"
Wisconsin conspiracy statute now embraces agreements to commit any crime in the Wisconsin statutes, the only sensible alternative to complete
re-examination of the "non-code" crimes for the
purpose of reclassifying some as civil matters is to
have the conspiracy statute apply discriminately
to some statutory crimes and not to others. Under
either method of remedying the present too-broad
IThis is made criminal by Wis. STAT. §§29.165(l),
29.63(d) (1953).
11Wis. STAT. §939.31 (1955).
70 Id., §36.50(2) (1955).
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impact of the conspiracy statute, the "non-code"
crimes must be taken into consideration.
The Model Penal Code and Non-Code Offenses
The most unique and far-reaching effort toward
producing a rational substantive law of crimes is
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
The overwhelming need for law reform has been
amply demonstrated by the Institute's Chief Reporter t To what extent is this a reform of all
penal law?
1. Scope of the Code
In the 1931 proposal of the Joint Committee on
Improvement of Criminal Justice it was suggested
that the American Law Institute research for a
Code of Criminal Law focus on the following questions:
"How far have legislatures sought to make new
social and economic regulations by invoking
criminal law? How do their provisions vary from
state to state? What happens in connection with
these regulatory laws? What different provisions
are made for the initiation of prosecutions under
such laws? What evils have grown up in connection with the enforcement of these and other
2
criminal laws?"
It appears, however, that if the research does include these questions, it will not be reflected in any
redrafted provisions of the "social and economic
regulations." The Chief Reporter of the Model
Penal Code has stated that the final product of the
project will be composed of four major parts:
"(1) the general provisions, encompassing a full
articulation of the basic principles that govern
the existence and scope of liability...
"(2) the definitions of specific offenses-at least
within the inajor areas of criminality on which
.our thought is mainly focused. [Emphasis supplied.)
"(3) the provisions governing the processes of
treatment and correction...
"(4) finally, what we have called 'organization
of correction', meaning the public law establishing and governing the various official agencies
responsible for dealing with offenders... ,,1
There is no indication that "major areas of criminality" means anything but a common law of
crimes brought up to date and expanded where
-1See Wechsler, op. cit. supra note 15.
"256 A.B.A. REP. 513, 522 (1931).
-3Wechsler, op. cil. supra note 22, at 322.

necessary, made consistent and rational, and
codified with all the drafting skill available. There
is no indication, in other words, that the Model
Penal Code project will accomplish much more
than was attempted in the Wisconsin revision.
This impression is reenforced by the comment to
the section of the code draft abolishing common
law crimes: "WhIile it will not be possible to reexamine all the areas of law in which the penal
sanction is employed, it is at least essential that
the area of common law offenses should be reexamined." 74
2. Draft ProvisionsA ffecting Non-Code Offenses
From some of the provisions of the code already
in draft form we may gauge the impact of the code
on the criminal statutes which the project apparently will not individually re-examine. There are
three areas of impact: (a) strict liability, (b) applicability of general provisions, and (c) duplication of some "non-code" crimes.
a. Strict Liability
Strict liability offenses are dealt with in Part I,
"General Provisions." Three parts of Tentative
Draft No. 4 (1955) are in point.
One section provides that if a strict liability
offense is created by statute outside the code, the
offense can be only a "violation."75 Section 1.04
divides all offenses into crimes (felonies, misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors) and violations. A violation is, therefore, something different,
at least semantically, from a crime.Y6 The code
finally provides that only a fine may be imposed
for a violationY7
The primary thrust of these provisions is to
permit strict liability offenses to continue as noncriminal "violations" for which a penalty no more
severe than a fine may be provided. But when the
74
MODEL PENAL CODE §1.05, comment at 106
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
75 Id., §2.05(2).
176 Cf. Wyngaard v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 527 (D.D.C.
1960), where conviction for what New York law called
an "offense," as distinguished from a "crime," was
nonetheless treated as conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude for purposes of establishing an alien's
deportability.
7 MODEL PENAL CODE §§6.02(1), (4), 6.03(4), (5),
(6) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In addition to the provision discussed in the text, there is also a limited
defense of mistake or ignorance of law, provided in id.,
§2.04, (3), (4), applicable to all offenses, including
violations. The narrowness of the defense, howe,'er,
makes it extremely difficult for a defendant to maintain
it successfully.
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proscribed result has been culpably brought about,
8
section 2.05(2)(b) permits a crime to be charged.
In thus treating all strict liability offenses alike,
the code neglects the distinction between statutes
with a proper deterrent role and statutes without
such a role. In fact, the comments to the draft
indicate the belief that no deterrent function is
involved at all, 79 and the code has adopted a
blanket dilution of the sanction available for all
strict liability offenses.
The dilution is produced by calling the offense
only a "violation," and by permitting only a fine
to be imposed. In those circumstances where
strict liability has vzo affirmative value, i.e., where
there is no deterrent effect, it is obviously unjust
to force an individual into the status of defendant
in proceedings where the state seeks a conviction
and a jury may adjudge guilt. Whether calling
these proceedings non-criminal significantly lessens
the hardship imposed is highly questionable. If
there are no grounds for state proceedings against
the individual, no "semantic manipulation" will
provide the grounds.
Where, on the other hand, the imposition of
strict liability may be effective in stimulating
higher standards of conduct, it is not at all clear
that it is wise to forbid any kind of incarceration.
In cases where the public interest in bodily security
is seriously in jeopardy, as in the manufacture of
food involving limited use of carcenogenic material,
it may be prudent to employ a short period of
incarceration even though the penalized conduct
hypothetically engenders no strong condemnation.
If an offense were committed involving a wide and
unauthorized distribution of a carcenogenic foodstuff, it is not likely that the public would view
with moral neutrality the one from whom the
harm emanated.
The point is that without a discriminating
examination of the situations in which legislatures
have imposed strict criminal liability, it is extremely difficult to adopt a policy well designed to
cope with the problems involved.
At first glance the provision for converting all
offenses which impose only fines into non-criminal
violations 0 appears very neatly to meet the problem of the undue size of the penal law. But is the
78 A person acts culpably if he acts purpose -ly,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently. These term.. are
defined in id., §2.02.
79 See note 30, supra, and accompanying text.
80 MODEL PENAL CODE §1.04(5) (Tent. Draft No. 4,

1955).
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penal law in fact unburdened? These offenses must
still be enforced. Any amount of fine may be imposed, since there is express exception to the five
hundred dollar ceiling for any amount a legislature
may specifically invoke.81 And this provision makes
no inroad on the number of times incarceration is
authorized outside of the penal code. In short, the
name of the offense has been changed from "crime"
to "violation" in some instances; whatever may be
the beneficial results expected from the change,
it does not appear that a realistic diminution in
the size of the penal law will be among them.
b. General Provisions
Another impact of the extant drafts of the Model
Penal Code is the application of all the "General
Provisions" of Part I to "non-code" offenses,
"unless the Code otherwise provides.""
This provision raises questions similar to those
noted in regard to the Wisconsin Criminal Code,
including the problem of creating conspiracy liability where the substantive harm may be minimal. 3 It can be restated here that the precise
impact of the "General Provisions" cannot be
estimated without examining the corpus of "noncode" offenses. However, to the extent that the
non-code penal law is deficient because it is subject
to unwritten and unthought-out general rules,
such as those relating to intoxication,9 ' entrapment,8 or insanity,8 6 a marked improvement is
accomplished by the across-the-board application.
c. Duplication
In undertaking to draft comprehensive statutes
"within the major areas of criminality" the code,
at times, covers the same ground as statutes that
may be outside a state's criminal code. For example, section 223.8 relates to fraud in insolvency.82
As is noted in the comment to this section, there is
a statute outside the criminal code in Massa-*
81 Note 77, supra.
s2 MODEL PENAL CODE

§1.05(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4,

1955).

83The draft provision for conspiracy makes the
conspiratorial object "crime." MODEL PENAL CODE
§5.03 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). It is thus open to the
same criticism. That is, there are many crimes which
pose so little substantive danger (even after the impact
of the code provision on "violations") that the "reaching back" inherent in conspiracy may be totally unjustified.
84
Id., §2.08 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
86 Id., §2.10.
86Id., §4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
87Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960.
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chusetts directed at misconduct under the same
circumstancesM but the Massachusetts statute
announces a broader prohibition than does the
Model Penal Code section.8 9 The comment to the
code section criticizes the Massachusetts statute,
stating that, "If justifiable at all, it belongs in a
code of business regulation rather than in a penal
code." 90
The policy underlying this comment is difficult
to discern. Two questions press for reply. What is
the criterion for determining which penal statutes
"belong" in the penal code and which do not?
Secondly, what turns upon the location of a particular penal statute?
The point to be emphasized is that the substantive offenses presented in the Model Penal Code
sometimes replace "non-code" offenses, thus consolidating related crimes.9' As noted above, however, in the event of a conflict between the code
provision and the "non-code" offense which would
be consolidated, it seems that the code policy
makers are prepared to assign the conflicting
offense to another statutory domicile without
resolving the question of whether it is or is not
acceptable penal law. In view of the fact that it is
-ihresolving difficult questions of this nature that
the code performs one of its most valuable functions, this policy is regrettable.
III. SuMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
-Evidence of the exact state of "non-code"
criminal statutes is admittedly skimpy. It would
be presumptuous to generalize conclusively either
geographically or chronologically. On the other
hand, there is nothing to indicate that Massachusetts and Wisconsin are atypical or that since
1937 the situation has improved. For certainly
since that time the role of government in private
affairs generally and in economic activity in particular has been steadily increasing.
81MAss. ANN.LAWS ch. 216, §136 (1955).
89Both the Model Penal Code and the Massachusetts
statute prohibit certain kinds of dealings with property
by a debtor after creditor action has been taken against
him. In addition, Massachusetts forbids the debtor to
expend any money "except such as may reasonably be
expended for the support of himself and family."
90Model Penal Code §223.8, comment, at 101 (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 1960).
91E.g., id. §208.22 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) proscribes "unsworn falsification to authorities" in terms
general enough to encompass such "non-code" offenses
as making a false statement concerning veterans' allowances, now penalized in MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 33,
App. §14-5 (1955).

On the basis of the available evidence it appears
warranted to conclude as follows:
1. The development of "non-code" criminal
law has generally lacked informed and critical
evaluation.
2. There are many reasons why this evaluation
is long overdue. These include the following considerations:
a. Many of these statutes seek to protect the
most vital interests of the individual and his
society through the imposition of controls and
penalties of the most severe n ature.
b. Substantive criminal law revision and the
development of new methods of treating convicted
offenders depend heavily upon views as to the
immoral nature of crime and criminals. Study of
"non-code" criminal law developments may well
reveal a legislative judgment that immorality is
no longer a necessary ingredient of al crime.
c. We know practically nothing about the exercise of the far-reaching power vested in those
charged with administering the "non-code" criminal law, except when instances of corruption are
brought to public attention.
d. The impression that so many of the "noncode" statutes pertain to business activity makes
it important to seek uniformity and standardization. Codes of criminal law which would include
the statutes now scattered in all directions would
be of immense value.
e. The pressure to exorcise strict liability statutes from the "non-code" law appears to be illconceived. There may well be an important role
for these statutes in a rational and ethical scheme
of regulation.
f. Rendering the present chaotic mass of laws
into a useful collection of codes has important
implications for doing business abroad, since it
may permit development of materials designed to
keep the American businessman out of the throes
of foreign criminal law.
3. The Louisiana and Wisconsin criminal law
revisions have done little to accomplish any of the
study, evaluation and reform needed in the "noncode" penal statutes. The lack of knowledge concerning these statutes frustrated application to
them of valuable provisions in the criminal code in
Wisconsin.
4. The Model Penal Code project is not designed
to undertake a comprehensive survey of "noncode" criminal law. The draft provisions of the
code and the comments thereto indicate a com-
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promise decision in regard to reform of strict
liability statutes. Being based on what is, in the
writer's view, an erroneous understanding of this
portion of "non-code" criminal law, the code
draws the line of compromise at a point that may,
in light of the actual nature of these statutes,
produce few affirmative results while neglecting
opportunities to achieve others.
The code also superimposes a significant number
of its provisions on the "non-code" penal statutes,
apparently without a complete awareness of the
contents of these statutes. As desirable as this may
be in regard to reform of such principles of general
application as the law of insanity, in other areas,
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such as conspiracy, some of the results may be both
undesirable and unnecessary.
Some of the Model Penal Code revisions of the
definitions of crimes overlap penal statutes sometimes found outside a criminal code collection.
When there is a conflict between the code provision
and such a law there is, regrettably, not a policy
of resolving the conflict so as to produce the most
rational statutes regardless of their location.
One must conclude that in discharging its duty
as custodian of the laws, the bar must meet the
severe need for critical effort in solving the manifold problems presented by the "non-code" criminal statutes.

